Suppose
Dilma doesn’t let you raise interest rates as much as you think is needed. Suppose
also that although markets are perfectly rational, they are still learning what
this CB’s monetary policy is about. (Suppose also that Celso is a fag –
actually you don’t need to make this hypothesis, for obvious reasons, which are
not related to Economics). Then, by giving out hawkish speeches, the CB can
raise the effective interest rate and try to control inflation, even if it does
not deliver it. It is nice way to amplify the power of the monetary policy, which
works until it doesn’t work anymore.
Why is X back?
ResponderExcluirMas parece haver divergências dentro do próprio BC, não?
ResponderExcluirVenderia títulos de prazo de vencimento de 3 meses a 6 meses ( ou faria repos para esse prazo) numa taxa mais elevada, deixaria a selic onde está, acentuando a inclinação da curva no braço. Só no gogó, o BC iria perder o resto de moral com a turma e suas falas seriam neutras rapidamente.
ResponderExcluirMaradona
I am the real X.
ResponderExcluirLet me say this: the noise to signal ratio is extremely noisy under this CB. I think people already learnt that, X.
You cannot infer shit from what they say because they very soon contradict the last statement. This in turn should lead to a more volatile yield curve. And that's a fact, do it in your excel spreadSHIT
With asymetric information and a fat-tailed prior distribution about the beliefs held by the general public regarding CB's preferences, I think the first X is right. Remember, these guys tightened in 2011/1, so it is not obvious that the market should know for sure they are of the hyper-dovish type. Right, X (i mean the second)?
ResponderExcluir